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Crisis and Armament
Economic Relations between Great Britain 
and Serbia –
The highest rise and insigniﬁcant presence
In  a period of intensive armament of the Serbian army began, and 
as the country was not ﬁnancially strong enough to meet all the projected 
expenses, a new and wide-ranging involvement of foreign capital in Serbia 
was inevitable. This created a ﬁnancial contest between the Great Powers 
for dominance over the country, and was a quiet prelude to the Balkan Wars 
and the First World War.
 Diplomatic relations between Serbia and Great Britain were established on  June 
, when Colonel George Lloyd Hodges handed his credentials to Prince Miloš, thus 
becoming the ﬁrst British General-Agent in the Principality of Serbia. Hodges’ activi-
ties were mainly aimed at supporting the autocratic Serbian monarch in his opposition 
to the inﬂuence of St. Petersburg and Constantinople. Nevertheless, as it was a period 
when Russian inﬂuence on the Porte was in the ascendant, and as Miloš’s misrule was 
meeting formidable resistance in Serbia, British diplomacy failed in its eﬀorts. Finally, 
Prince Miloš was forced to abdicate, and the ﬁrst British diplomatic representative in 
Serbia, ﬁnding his position untenable, left the country as well. 
The next British diplomatic representative in Serbia was T. G. de Fonblanque. This 
time, British diplomacy decided to avoid any trouble. Nevertheless, Fonblanque was not 
impressed by the regime established in Serbia: he despised the weakness of Prince Ale-
ksandar Karadjordjević and pointed out in his despatches the high levels of corruption 
in the powerful oligarchy assembled in the State Council. Above all, he never got used 
to Serbia and maintained a hostile attitude towards the Serbs. Paradoxically, although 
alienated and inimically disposed, Fonblanque had been virtually forgotten in Belgrade 
for almost eighteen years. After the / revolution in Hungary, he helped to eﬀect 
the escape of its leader Kossuth, and so attracted the personal enmity of the Austrian 
Emperor Franz Joseph. When, at the outbreak of the Crimean War, Russia and Austria 
threatened to occupy Serbia, it was Britain that temporarily won the greatest inﬂuence 
on Serbian aﬀairs. But, as the Paris Peace settlement did not signiﬁcantly enhance the 
position and status of the Principality of Serbia, British prestige promptly decreased.
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For Serbia, the question of army modernisation became a burning 
priority after the report by Colonel Mašin, submitted to the Serbian Gov-
ernment in , reviled the Serbian army not only for lagging behind its 
mighty imperial foes, the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary, but for 
Restoration of the Obrenović dynasty in  did not bring much change in Anglo-
Serbian relations. During the ’s Serbia was trying to win complete independence 
and to liberate neighbouring districts. The next British consul, Langworth (–), 
perceived Serbia as a battleﬁeld for the two equally dangerous movements for the Eu-
ropean balance of power: Pan-Slavism and South-Slavism. When, in the Eastern Crisis 
Russia defeated the Ottoman Empire and Pan-Slavism appeared to be triumphant in 
the Balkans, Great Britain stood up as the last protector of the Ottoman Empire. Nev-
ertheless, the crisis opened a formidable rift between the approach of British politicians 
to the Balkans and the attitude of the public. Some politicians, as was the case with 
Disraeli, were motivated by political pragmatism to support the Porte, and at the same 
time were almost completely without interest in the Ottoman reform and the position 
of Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire. On the other side were the Liberals, 
strongly supported by the British public, who became very sensitive to any news about 
unrestrained oppression in the Ottoman Empire. The most famous proponent of this 
policy was Gladstone. 
The ’s and ’s were a period when Serbia and Romania, although formally 
independent since , were gradually becoming politically and economically depend-
ent on Austria-Hungary. Even though, in , the British diplomatic representative in 
Belgrade was promoted in rank to Minister Extraordinary and Envoy Plenipotentiary, 
direct political interest in Serbia was in a process of decline. At the turn of the century 
the situation changed to a certain degree. The Macedonian uprising of  and the as-
sassination of the Serbian royal couple attracted the attention of the British public and 
government. The Macedonian uprising triggered European mediation and the common 
reforming action of the Great Powers towards Turkey-in-Europe. On the other side, 
the brutal murder of King Aleksandar Obrenović and Queen Draga left a long-lasting 
mark on relations between London and Belgrade. Diplomatic relations were broken for 
three years, and remained estranged until . The British Government’s conditions 
for their restoration involved the elimination from public life of the oﬃcers who had 
played major roles in the conspiracy. As the new regime and the Karadjordjević dynasty 
were still weak, and relied heavily on the support of the army, genuine normalisation 
required considerable time. Before that could happen, the economic rivalry and politi-
cal dispute between Serbia and Austria-Hungary had already started, while Britain did 
not take part in the ﬁrst stages of the economic contest between the Great Powers over 
the provision of loans for Serbia and the establishment of an armament programme 
for the Serbian army. So when in  a new British Minister, John B. Whitehead, 
was appointed, Britain was lagging behind the other Great Powers as far as inﬂuence 
on Serbian aﬀairs was concerned. The British position improved somewhat during the 
Bosnian crisis of , but British diplomacy limited the signs of its new benevolence 
towards Serbia strictly to moral support. Serbia became interesting to the Foreign Of-
ﬁce mainly because Serbia’s adversary was Austria-Hungary, a devoted ally of Germany. 
Beyond that fact there was nothing about Serbia that was attractive for British diplo-
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lagging behind Bulgaria as well. Another impulse came with the humiliat-
ing Annexation crisis and the Austrian actions in Sandjak, Malissori and 
the Kosovo-Metohija region. Alongside the military issues, Serbia had felt 
strong economic pressure from its mighty neighbour Austria-Hungary. The 
period after  witnessed an intensifying economic contest between the 
two countries, which culminated in the Customs War in . An eco-
nomic outlet onto the sea of one of its neighbours thus became the principal 
political obsession of Serbian politicians and capitalists, and it was usually 
identiﬁed with the independence of the country. As has already been men-
tioned,  was the year when the idea of a military and political alliance 
between the Balkan countries attracted once more the attention of local 
politicians. Whether such an alliance would be anti-Austrian or anti-Ot-
toman, peaceful or aggressive, was being kept an obscure secret, for Balkan 
politicians were fully aware that their freedom of action would mainly de-
pend on the complex balance between the Great Powers. Successful reform 
and armament of the Serbian army was the main precondition that such an 
alliance would be eﬀectively negotiated, and that Serbian interests would be 
well placated within it.
When Sir Ralph Paget arrived in Belgrade, economic relations be-
tween Great Britain and Serbia were twofold. The range of potential ﬁ-
nancial and commercial activities in Serbia was limited, and that was why 
macy. Serbia was not perceived as worth considering as a possible future ally. The obvi-
ous instability of the Karadjordjević dynasty, the fragility of the new parliamentarian 
political system, and the questionable virtues of the Serbian army all raised concerns 
that internal crises in Serbia might well aﬀect relations between the Great Powers in 
the future.
 Whitehead to Grey, General Report on the Kingdom of Servia for the year , 
Belgrade,  April , -, in British Documents on Foreign Aﬀairs: Reports and 
Papers from the Foreign Oﬃce Conﬁdential Print, gen. eds. Kenneth Bourne and D. Cam-
eron Watt, Part I, From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the First World War, series F: 
Europe, –, ed. J.V. Keiger, vol.  (University Publications of America, ; 
further referred to as BdoFA).
 D. Djordjević, Milovan Milovanović (Belgrade, ); Ch. Heilmreich, The Diplomacy 
of the Balkan Wars, – (London, ).
 Sir Ralph Spencer Paget (–) was in British diplomatic service from . 
He was British Minister in Guatemala, Siam, Bavaria, Serbia and Denmark. In  
he was sent to Rio de Janeiro as the ﬁrst British Ambassador to Brazil. Paget was Brit-
ish Minister in Belgrade from  to  (during the Balkan Wars –) and 
in  spent several months in Serbia as High Commissioner of British Red Cross. 
Ralph Paget was Assistant Under-secretary of Foreign Aﬀaires in , when together 
with Sir William Tyrell drafted the ﬁrst oﬃcial British plan of post-war composition of 
Europe. Cedomir Antic, “Sir Ralph Paget and British Policy towards Serbia from  
to ” (MA thesis, Bristol, ).
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it only attracted small and not particularly inﬂuential British companies. 
Although occasionally raised very loud, their voice had only a modest eﬀect 
on the Foreign Oﬃce, which found many political obstacles to a wider in-
volvement of British capital in Serbia. Animosity towards the Serbian army, 
in which the detested regicides preserved much of their previous inﬂuence, 
was still alive, as was an undisguised contempt for corrupt Belgrade politi-
cians and the feeble Karadjordjević dynasty. The Balkans were also a region 
in which Britain did not have any direct political or economic interest, but 
this was not the case with British imperial allies and adversaries. In this 
context, the region had a disproportional importance for British foreign 
policy. So, it was natural that British diplomats deﬁned Britain’s economic 
relations with Serbia in vague terms. They had tried to explain the apparent 
political obstacles and pressures for a wider involvement of British capital in 
Serbia by the absence of any major British investment or any already-exist-
ing economic presence.
Above all, Great Britain was very interested in the destiny of the Ot-
toman Empire, and was naturally anxious about the pro-Ottoman feelings 
of a hundred million of its Muslim subjects in India. Relations with Russia 
were also the source of considerable unease for Great Britain and made it 
very reluctant to become involved. In , an alliance was concluded be-
tween the two old adversaries. However, while Persia had been the last and 
most formidable obstacle to overcome before that alliance was concluded, 
the Balkans, which were to become the centre of two major crises that ush-
ered in the First World War, were not particularly discussed. When, about 
, Great Britain tried to move closer to Austria-Hungary, the Foreign 
Oﬃce did not consider that a common stand with Russia over the Balkans 
was necessary. On the other hand, France, the closest British ally, was ea-
ger to take the place of Austria-Hungary as the ﬁnancial patron of Serbia. 
The bids to provide Serbian loans thus turned out to be a contest between 
French and German capital and ultimately resulted in a compromise, which 
 Many authors consider xenophobia and corruption as the main reason for modest 
involvement of foreign capital in Serbia, cf. M. Palairet, The Balkan Economies, c. –
 (Cambridge, ), , .
 Paget expressed dissatisfaction with the value of commercial exchange between the 
two countries, although aware of its potential for steady increase. BdoFA, .
 J. Heller, British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire (–), (London, ), 
.
 Russia tended to reinforce its political inﬂuence on the Balkans with economical in-
volvement, but after the  revolution and the redeﬁnition of its foreign policy aims, 
this ceased to be a priority. Just before the Balkan War, Russian Balkan policy became 
highly limited and dependent upon the Straits question. 
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ﬁnally imposed French economic supremacy in Serbia. The participation 
of France in two major loans that Serbia raised in / and  was 
so signiﬁcant that France became the owner of more than three-quarters 
of all the debts of the Serbian State. In the struggle to give loans, Great 
Britain, which restored relations with Serbia in , was a newcomer. Brit-
ish diplomats did not believe that any expected proﬁts could be worth even 
the slightly possible deterioration of Britain’s otherwise good relations with 
France.
Although the issue was not important enough to provoke rivalry be-
tween Britain and France, the Serbian loans were still a very tempting and 
attractive investment. The Serbian political elite considered armament and 
the Danube–Adriatic Railway an urgent matter, crucial for the survival of 
the State. This was the reason why the Serbian Government was not will-
ing to become economically dependent on Germany or, especially, on Aus-
tria-Hungary. So it was almost entirely up to ﬁnancial syndicates from the 
countries of the Triple Entente to deﬁne conditions and to impose them, 
without expecting many diﬃculties. Successive loans of  and  mil-
lion francs had been taken mostly from France. Their conditions were so 
unfavourable that in the case of the second loan the total sum designed to 
be repaid by  was supposed to reach . million francs. Aware that 
its eﬀorts to preserve political independence could have the possible eﬀect 
of making the country highly dependent on France, the Serbian Govern-
ment at ﬁrst tried to attract Russian and British capital, and then to involve 
industrial investments from both countries, in order to make the French 
pressure lighter.
The Serbian Government had not been completely frank about its real 
aims. Although French predominance in Serbian loans and armament had 
already been decided before Ralph Paget was appointed British minister to 
Belgrade, the eﬀorts of Serbian diplomats to attract British capital did not 
cease right up to the beginning of the First World War. However, despite all 
the promises, British capital largely remained uninvolved, and only few of 
the smaller orders for military material were placed in Britain. The real aim 
of Serbian politicians became obvious after a while to the representatives of 
the British Legation in Belgrade: British ﬁnancial syndicates and military 
industry were frequently pursued only with the purpose of using them to 
negotiate down French conditions, in case they were too harsh. In reality, 
 In all loans that Serbia had raised between  and  the French share was , 
while the Austro-German was . Lj. Aleksić-Pejković, Odnosi Srbije sa Francuskom i 
Engleskom – (The Relations between Serbia, France and Great Britain from 
 to ), (Belgrade, ), .
 Ibid., .
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British support was rarely seriously considered as an alternative. This made 
British representatives in Serbia even more suspicious of and closed towards 
potential oﬀers, even when, as was the case with Sir J. B. Whitehead, Paget’s 
predecessor, they were personally interested.
At the beginning of , British diplomacy made major eﬀorts to 
acquire a share in the  million franc loan that the Serbian State Mortgage 
Bank was negotiating with French creditors. Under the burden of previ-
ous loans concluded in France, and despite very unfavourable conditions, 
the Bank ﬁnally gave priority to Paris again. As the conclusion of the 
loan was immediately followed by negotiations for the orders of armaments, 
British diplomacy was trying to negotiate its involvement directly with the 
French. The negotiations began informally in Paris, where the British am-
bassador Sir Francis Bertie received the representatives of the French Bank 
group, who recommended that he should inquire of the French government 
whether there was any possibility of part of an artillery order being placed 
in Great Britain. The share that the French bankers promised to Bertie 
was moderate but appeared to be satisfactory, for out of  million francs 
reserved for military purchases (of the  million franc loan), Britain was 
promised ½ millions. However, although ﬁrst reactions from Serbia were 
very optimistic, the British plans came to nothing when they met the 
resolute opposition of French diplomacy and, more surprisingly, the joint 
resistance of the governing Serbian parties. Subsequently, Whitehead 
tried to save some smaller orders, namely machine guns, for Vickers, Sons 
and Maxim Company. Even so, neither the British minister nor his superi-
ors harboured any illusion that the ﬁnal decision would be in favour of the 
British applicant. That impression was conﬁrmed only three weeks later, 
 After one such case in February , the British Minister made an oﬃcial protest, 
but the Serbian Bank did not abolish the concluded loan, nor did it resume negotia-
tions. Whitehead to Grey, Belgrade,  March , FO /. Indicative was the re-
action in the Foreign Oﬃce. Sir Edward Grey, after a meeting with the Serbian Chargé 
d’Aﬀaires, remarked that the negotiations were not “a matter in which HMG could 
intervene diplomatically”. Grey to Whitehead, London,  March , Minute. 
 Aleksić-Pejković, Odnosi, .
 Whitehead to Grey, Belgrade,  February , Serbia FO /.
 Bertie to Grey, Paris,  January , FO /.
 Caillard to Bertie, Hotel Chatam, Paris,  January , FO /.
 Whitehead to Grey,  January , FO /.
 In conversation with the Serbian Prime Minister Pašić, Whitehead naturally got 
assurances that the main guilt for the rejection was on Pašić’s coalition partners, the 
Independent Radicals. Whitehead to Grey,  January , FO /.
 Hardinge remarked that British “only play the part of letter box in entire aﬀair”, Opt. 
Cit. Minute.
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when the eﬀorts of another British applicant, Armstrong, Whitworth and 
Company, to sell , riﬂes to Serbia met the same fate.
On the other hand, sometimes the British government appeared to be 
the main obstacle for the immediate interests of the British military indus-
try. Sir Ralph Paget had already been formally appointed British minister to 
the Court of Serbia when a “Dreadnought aﬀair” attracted the attention of 
the sensitive British public. In June , a Major Maunsell visited Belgrade 
as a representative of the Vickers, Sons and Maxim Company. Maunsell 
oﬀered the Serbian Government an opportunity to purchase “one or two 
powerful gunboats” for service on the Danube and Sava rivers. As the bor-
der between Serbia and Austria-Hungary was an ambiguous issue, so was 
the defence of the Serbian capital, and the Foreign Oﬃce promptly denied 
any help or support to the British visitor. Bridge suggests that Whitehead, 
despite his family ties with one of the company’s owners, strongly warned 
Grey that the , contract, however beneﬁcial it might have been 
for British industry, could cause a serious deterioration in relations with 
Austria-Hungary. The presence of a British major, and his activities in 
Belgrade, aroused the suspicion of Austrian diplomats. The British ambas-
sador in Vienna was asked for an explanation, while the Austrian minister 
in Belgrade made it known to his British colleague that the entire operation 
was being carefully monitored. The reaction of the Foreign Oﬃce was very 
tense. As the Serbian government had just asked for some expertise, a form 
of assistance which the British government had usually given willingly, the 
response now was negative, and any oﬃcial connection with Maunsell was 
again denied.
The contract was not concluded. The already-familiar pattern was 
repeated, but this time it was motivated by British diplomatic priorities. 
However, the British press, another important factor, interfered almost im-
mediately. The entanglement surfaced in Vienna, where no one expected it 
would, when Alfred Steed, Austrian correspondent of The Times, made a 
 Whitehead to Grey,  March , FO /.
 Whitehead to Grey, Belgrade,  June , FO /.
 F.R. Bridge, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary – (London, ), -, 
BD VII, .
 Count Forgach even mentioned them as “dreadnoughts”, adopting the same term that 
had been used in oﬀer to Serbian Government. Whitehead to Grey, Belgrade,  June 
, FO /. 
 Edward Grey remarked: “We can not urge… to help Serbia in arms against Austria 
and it is perfectly futile for her to attempt to do it. Two gunboats on the river, however 
good, would not save Belgrade from the Austrian army. If Servia orders the gunboats 
she can do so, but we can not lend opinion.” Opt. Cit. Minute.
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carefully premeditated eﬀort to embarrass the British Government. Steed, 
already well-known as an eager supporter of Balkan Christians, pursued the 
campaign against Austro-Hungarian policy towards Crete in June , 
which had much embarrassed Whitehall. This time, probably provoked by 
the failure of Maunsell’s mission, Steed transmitted in full an otherwise un-
noticed article that had originally appeared in Tagblat. The Austrian news-
paper had written that oﬃcial relations between Serbia and Britain had 
been strained due to the alleged refusal of the Serbian Government to give 
orders for war material to British ﬁrms, and even announced a rupture be-
tween the two countries. For Cartwright, the British ambassador in Vienna, 
it seemed obvious that Steed’s main intention was to suggest to the British 
public that Austria-Hungary had inspired the rumour. Steed’s manoeuvre 
was also obvious and unpleasant for the Serbian government, which not 
only hastened to publish a refutation, but preferred to do so in The Times.
So, for the sake of good relations with Austria-Hungary, the Foreign 
Oﬃce withheld the contract worth a quarter of the annual British export 
to Serbia, and prevented its conclusion. Even so, in his Annual Report for 
 the Secretary of the British Legation in Belgrade put the entire blame 
for the symbolic British presence in the Serbian economy on the “rotten 
system of placing army contracts in Serbia”. But, while France managed 
to become the main creditor of the Serbian State, its part in the much 
more modest Serbian commercial world remained insigniﬁcant. When, 
as a result of recovery after the Annexation crisis, Serbian imports in  
increased by , it was the increased British share in it that proportion-
ally overtook the increases of other Great Powers. The decline in com-
mercial exchange with Austria-Hungary, which came as a consequence of 
her Customs War with Serbia, made the rise in Serbian exports to Great 
Britain much more spectacular. After Serbia had chosen the British outpost 
of Malta as the transit station for the export of its cattle, the total amount of 
Serbian exports to the United Kingdom increased by  (from a fairly 
modest  to ,). The Serbian enthusiasm for foreign commerce 
was only temporary, since it was inspired by the strong inﬂuence of the 
 Bridge, Great Britain, .
 Having in mind possible consequences, Grey was outraged. For him, Steed was noth-




 The rise in British trade with Serbia of almost , from , to ,, can 
only be compared with that of Germany. Ibid., .
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Annexation crisis. However, despite the constantly tense political relations 
with Austria-Hungary, by  the neighbouring monarchy had again be-
come the principal buyer and supplier of Serbia, a trend disrupted only by 
the Balkan Wars and the First World War. That was why Sir Ralph Paget 
considered the British share in Serbian commerce to be unsatisfactory, al-
though in comparison with  its increase was evident.
Despite all this, any increase in commerce with Serbia was to a very 
high degree related to the readiness of foreign countries to extend credit to 
her. In , the Ethelburga (Financial) Syndicate competed for a Belgrade 
municipal loan of  million francs. As might have been expected, the 
proposal was rejected even though it was the lowest bid. British diplomats 
suspected the unwritten provisions and “provisional arrangements” with 
French ﬁnanciers as a main reason for this new defeat of British interests. 
On the other hand, as was the case with the military industry, although it 
was oﬃcially interested in involving British capital in Serbia, the Foreign 
Oﬃce did not show a great deal of intention to support commercial ini-
tiatives politically and to harmonise political activities with the fruitless 
eﬀorts of British capitalists. In  it became apparent that the Ottoman 
Government was going to reject Serbian proposals for the construction of 
the Danube–Adriatic Railway. Requested to support the representation to 
the Porte, HMG declared that it “did not care to take the initiative in any steps 
at the Porte to promote the enterprise for which is not directly interested”. The 
attitude would soon be seen to be regrettable, for only a year later British 
diplomacy had to stand behind a British company which was seeking to be 
contracted to construct the port of Prahovo (one planned terminus of the 
Danube–Adriatic Railway). The company was J&W Stewart (Mc Laugh-
lin), which specialised in concrete constructions and was trying to compete 
for the contract against the Russian-backed Taburno. There was something 
minimalist in the approach that the British company assumed. Allegedly 
backed by certain circles in the British Government, J&W Stewart did not 
even succeed in establishing a good contact with the British Legation in 
Belgrade. This was despite the fact that Sir Ralph Paget was tirelessly try-
ing to win over the support of the Serbian Prime Minister Pašić for the 
application. His eﬀorts were sincere, but Paget, on the grounds of previ-
ous experiences, did not even for a moment have any doubts that the ﬁ-
 The imports from the United Kingdom had risen by  in  in comparison with 
, but the rise was just  in comparison with . At the same time the tremen-
dous Serbian export rise of  recorded in  was replaced with a modest and 




nal response would be negative. Again the British company had oﬀered 
the lowest price and better conditions, but Paget was strongly convinced 
that the open favour the Serbian government showed towards Mr. Taburno 
would be decisive. Paget did not become any more optimistic even when 
the Serbian Parliament rejected Taburno’s oﬀer. The course of events proved 
him right, because after the outbreak of the First Balkan War the entire 
Danube–Adriatic Railway project was abandoned.
On the eve of the First Balkan War, it appeared for a moment that 
British ﬁnanciers had ﬁnally decided to take a ﬁrm position in Serbia by 
establishing the Anglo-Servian Bank. The sum of   ( million 
francs) that was oﬀered as initial capital seemed to be a ﬁrm assurance that 
the concession would eventually be granted. This time, however, Sir Ralph 
Paget was doubtful not just about the frankness of the Serbian negotiators.
The talks were very long and were eventually interrupted by the war; nev-
ertheless, at the very beginning, even before he received instructions from 
the Foreign Oﬃce, the British minister had not been particularly eager to 
give any assistance to Mr. Neﬀ, the representative of the British trust (a 
ﬁnancial syndicate). Paget’s wariness was ultimately justiﬁed, for his initial 
qualms about Mr. Neﬀ were reinforced by intelligence that the British trust 
was merely a smokescreen for Hungarian capital. Between October  
and August , the Ottoman Empire, one of four European empires that 
met their demise in the First World War, had begun to crumble. The Balkan 
Wars were the ﬁrst Imperial crisis and they ushered in the First World War, 
which had a direct impact on the European states. The armies of the small 
Balkan states, which through eﬀorts which had previously been unimagi-
nable brought about the end of Ottoman dominance in the Balkans, had 
been ﬁnanced and armed by the Great Powers. In the complicated balance 
between the Great Powers, those countries only achieved importance when 
their united armies reached a size that not even some of the Great Powers 
were able to raise two years later. Serbia was the greatest surprise of the 
Balkan War for Austria-Hungary, but the Serbian army could never have 
risen to become a ﬁrst rate power on the peninsula without French loans 
and armaments. Among the Great Powers, Great Britain had the weakest 
economic ties with Serbia, and only indirect political interests. That fact 
enabled Britain to act as the main mediator in the crisis and to make a 
 Paget to Grey, Belgrade,  September , FO /.
 BdoFA, .
 Paget to Grey,  September , FO /.
 BdoFA, .
 A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, – (London, ), .
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crucial contribution to peace negotiations. As has already been mentioned, 
the main factors in the rapprochement between Great Britain and Serbia 
were a consequence of the needs of general and internal British policy. The 
British public, and to a lesser degree British diplomacy, had already become 
hostile towards the Turks and were to some extent anti-Austrian. However, 
British diplomacy had many reasons not to become pro-Serbian. The diﬀer-
ence between the British and French attitudes rested mainly on the fact that 
France was economically involved in the region. The absence of economic 
interests, however, did not exclude the economic factor from British policy 
towards the Balkans. British industry had interests in expansion in Serbia, 
and although those interests were in their early stages before , they 
most certainly existed. But while British involvement was insigniﬁcant, 
the inﬂuence of Sir Ralph Paget on the development of economic links 
between the two countries during the period that he was at the head of 
the British Legation in Belgrade had a much wider importance. The main 
characteristics of Paget’s economic policy towards Serbia were caution and 
restraint. He was careful not to run the risk of competing with Britain’s ally 
– France, and was far too suspicious of Russia to encourage British rivalry 
with Germany and Austria-Hungary.
Institute for Balkan Studies UDC (.:)»/»
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art ..(=)»/»
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 In the Annual Report for , the Chargé d’Aﬀaires in the British Legation Dayrell 
Crackanthorpe expressed his belief that Serbia, which in the War had “proved herself 
capable of acquiring a solid position among European nations”, would manage to weak-
en the predominating economic inﬂuence of France and Germany on her economy, 
BdoFA, -. As Serbia had spent a sum of its three annual budgets ( million 
dinars) during the Balkan Wars it seems obvious that the country could only become 
more economically dependent. M. Cornwall, “The First World War”, in Serbia, Decision 
for War , ed. K. Wilson (London, ), .
